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The paper investigates small business lending as an information problem. It models
the eﬀects of information asymmetries within the bank combined with ﬁxed wages. Two
kinds of ineﬃciencies arise in equilibrium: the credit oﬃcer either sometimes shirks or he
is occasionally ﬁred. In both cases lending falls below the ﬁrst-best level. The solution,
when the bank accepts the information asymmetries, is called the centralized structure.
Under decentralized structure the bank employs additional supervisors to mitigate the
information asymmetries within its organization. Decentralized banks manage to ﬁnance
more small ﬁrms, but incur higher costs than centralized ones. Small banks are interpreted
as a bank with relatively few credit oﬃcers, whom can be monitored without information
asymmetries. The speciﬁcation allows for investigating the eﬀects of banking consolidation
and technological change on small business lending. The model suggests that not banking
size, but organizational structure is decisive in small business lending.
JEL classiﬁcation: G21, G34, J30
Keywords: corporate governance, banking, small business lending, eﬃciency wage
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The paper provides a new perspective on the eﬀects of banking consolidation on small
business lending. A theoretical model is developed to understand the internal workings of the
bank. The most important conclusion is that not bank size, but rather the bank’s organiza-
tional structure is crucial for small business lending. Thus, the ongoing banking consolidation
is not necessarily bad for small businesses. However, a close attention should be paid to the
internal organization of banks as the determinant of small business lending.
The paper is motivated by three basic observations. First, small businesses are vital in
the modern economy. Small businesses employ two-thirds of the EU and half of the US work-
force. Small businesses are also crucial in the eventual creation of large ﬁrms. Second, small
businesses crucially depend on bank lending. The share of bank debt to total debt is roughly
t w i c ea sh i g hi ns m a l lﬁr m st h a ni nl a r g eﬁrms. Third, fast-paced banking consolidation leads
to a more concentrated banking system. Roughly one-third of Eurozone and US banks have
disappeared in the past ten years.
The interaction of the above three factors prompts the question: How banking consolida-
tion aﬀects small business lending? This is the main question investigated in this paper.
The paper builds a theoretical model based on information asymmetries within the bank
and the usage of ﬁxed wages. The model formally investigates the consequences of information
asymmetries between bank managers or headquarters and the credit oﬃcers lending to small
businesses. Credit oﬃcers are assumed to have more detailed information on their clientele
than their supervisors. The second assumption of ﬁxed wage is mainly based on casual industry
observations and to a lesser degree on theoretical evidence.
The model shows two equilibria. The ﬁrst is characterized by no ﬁring, and slack eﬀort.
The bank demands low output, which the credit oﬃcer can always reach. Consequently, the
credit oﬃcer is never ﬁred. In this equilibrium the eﬃciency loss stems from shirking. The
credit oﬃcer does not provide additional eﬀort when there are higher than prescribed lending
opportunities. The ﬁrst equilibrium resembles to the continental European labor setup and it
is called the Frankfurt policy after the continental ﬁnancial center.
The second equilibrium is characterized by disciplinary ﬁring and disruption. The bank
demands high output from the credit oﬃc e r .T h ec r e d i to ﬃcer, however, can not always comply
with these demands — and it is ﬁred then. The eﬃciency loss here stems from disruption of
lending. When the credit oﬃcer knows that the targets are unattainable, it stops providing
eﬀort. The second equilibrium resembles to the workings of the Anglo-Saxon labor markets
and is called the London policy.
An extension of the model allows for the bank to decrease the information distance and
asymmetry by increasing the number of supervisors. This is called decentralization in the
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all the lending opportunities. Supervisors can receive the same information as credit oﬃcers
and can write contingent contracts. Decentralization is, however, costly, as the bank has
to employ more supervisors. Centralization, on the other hand, implies ineﬃcient lending
volumes. Naturally, the bank chooses in equilibrium the organizational form which is more
proﬁtable.
Small banks can be interpreted in the model as banks with few credit oﬃcers. These
few credit oﬃcers are always supervised eﬃciently. However, there is an unused supervising
capacity - even a single supervisor could monitor more credit oﬃcers. Thus, supervision is
wasteful.
The model can allow for investigating the consequences of banking consolidation. Banking
consolidation might hurt small business lending, if a centralized large bank acquires a small
bank. However, wasteful supervision decreases even in this case. Thus, the aggregate welfare
eﬀects are unclear.
Banking consolidation does not aﬀect small business lending if a decentralized large bank
acquires the small bank. In this case banking consolidation is clearly welfare improving.
Wasteful supervision declines and small business lending remains on the ﬁrst-best level.
These results are in sharp contrast with the implications of the traditional portfolio theory
of lending. The portfolio theory abstracts from the information asymmetries and sees lending
as a portfolio allocation problem. As large banks have access to lending to large ﬁrms (that
small bank do not have because of their size), large banks are able to diversify better than
small banks. This better diversiﬁcation implies that large banks allocate less of their port-
folio to small businesses. Consequently, according to the portfolio theory of lending banking
consolidation is harmful for small business lending.
This model concludes, that not size, but organizational structure is important. The way
how banks handle the information asymmetries within their organization is crucial for the
volume of small business lending. The policy implication of the paper calls for a diﬀerent
approach to investigate the eﬀects of banking consolidation. It directs attention towards the
corporate governance of banks, rather than the size of banks.
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This paper investigates the eﬀects of banking consolidation on small business lending. It builds
a theoretical model, which explicitly focuses on the internal corporate governance of banks.
The model investigates the eﬀects of ﬁxed wages and information asymmetries within the bank
on eﬃciency. The paper argues that these building blocks - though relevant in other sectors
too - are particularly characteristic of small business bank lending. Extensions of the model
are used to allow for the explicit investigation of decentralization and centralization - and also
the size of the bank. These extension provide tools to investigate the consequences of banking
consolidation. The paper ﬁnds that banking consolidation does not necessarily decrease small
business lending.
Bank lending to small businesses has an eminent importance in the modern economy for
three interrelated factors. First, small businesses are important in the modern economy. SMEs
(small and medium sized enterprises) employ roughly half of the US and two-thirds of the EU
workforce. Moreover, these small ﬁrms are also vital in the eventual creation of large ﬁrms.
Second, small ﬁrms heavily rely on bank ﬁnancing. The share of bank debt to total debt in
small ﬁrms is around double than that of the large ﬁrms and in some countries exceeds 60%
of all debt.1 Third, a signiﬁcant portion of these small ﬁrms are ﬁnanced by small banks,
whose number is decreasing. The fast-paced consolidation concentrates the banking sector at
an unprecedented rate. Small banks are disappearing at an appalling rate. The number of
banks has declined by roughly one-third in both the US and the euro-zone in the 1990s.2
The policy question is: Should the credit supply of small businesses decrease in proportion
with the number of small banks? If the answer is aﬃrmative then traditionally bank dependent
SMEs would face troubles from banking consolidation.
Some empirical evidence indeed warns that banking consolidation might be harmful for
small businesses. Small banks lend higher proportion of their assets to small ﬁr m sa si ti s
reviewed in Berger, Demsetz and Strahan (1999). New ﬁndings in Hooks (2000), Berger,
Klapper and Udell (2001) and Berger, Miller, Peterson, Rajan and Stein (2002) support the
earlier results. Berger et al (1998) and Sapienza (2002) ﬁnd on the US and Italian market
respectively that after M&As the new bank reduces ﬁnancing to small ﬁrms compared to the
before merger ﬁnancing level.3
Moreover, traditional portfolio theory supports the notion that banking consolidation ad-
1Data from G10
2US: G10 p407; Eurozone: constructed G10, ECB data
3However, the picture is more controversial, if we look at aggregate data. The preliminary results in Berger,
Demsetz and Strahan (1999) and Bonaccorsi di Patti and Gobbi (2001) do not seem to warrant the concerns
for decreasing aggregate SME ﬁnancing. Though consolidated banks decrease small business lending, newly
established and small banks provide suﬃcient additional credit.
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banks are able to ﬁnance a wider range of ﬁrms, including for instance large enterprises. Con-
sequently, large banks can diversify their portfolio better than small banks, and they lend less
to small businesses. As a result, the traditional portfolio theory predicts size to be the most
important factor in small business lending: large banks ﬁnance small ﬁrms less. This implies
that banking consolidation adversely eﬀects small business lending.
The model here aims at understanding the eﬀect of banking consolidation on small business
lending. It departs from the portfolio theory by realizing that lending is more than a portfolio
allocation choice. It also involves information handling and the motivation of credit oﬃcers.
Thus the paper is linked to two streams of literatures. First, the corporate ﬁnance literature
is linked to investigating the internal organization of the bank. Second, the labor economics
and the eﬃciency wage literature is linked to the motivation of the credit oﬃcer.
This modeling of banking corporate governance represents a new strand in the corporate
ﬁnance literature. The literature, with the notable exception of Stein (2002), did not focus
on the contracting problem within the bank as it is reviewed for instance in Bolton and
Scharfstein (1998). The research explicitly modeling bank lending such as Diamond (1984,
1991) and Bolton and Freixas (2000) focuses on the information asymmetries between the
bank and the debtor. The contracting problem within the bank arises only as a question in
Diamond (1984): Who monitors the monitor?
Stein (2002) investigates similar problems, though with diﬀerent tools. His paper originates
from the internal capital markets literature and arrives to the contracting problems within
the bank from this perspective. He contrasts decentralized and hierarchical ﬁrms in terms of
handling soft and hard information. Hierarchical ﬁrms are better suited to deal with hard
information as it as easily passed through their hierarchy. On the other hand, decentralized
ﬁrms handle soft information better, as these ﬁrms do not have to harden it. Stein (2002) also
suggests that his model be best used to understand banking consolidation.
The model presented here is, however, signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from the Stein (2002) model.
Most importantly, it focuses exclusively on soft information handling and contrasts two kinds
of corporate governance mechanisms: centralization and decentralization. Nevertheless, the
similar focus, that is investigating banking consolidation and small business lending through
the contracting problems within the bank, links the two papers.
Through the assumption of ﬁxed wages the model is also linked to the eﬃciency wage
literature originating from Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984). In Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) ﬁxed
wages were imposed exogenously without further theoretical investigation. It can be shown,
however, that under certain conditions ﬁxed wages are optimal. Under relational contracting
ﬁxed wages might prevail as MacLeod and Malcolmson (1998) show. The relational contracting
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bonuses, if they can renegotiate implicit contracts. This approach is conﬁrmed by numerous
anecdotal evidence such as the well-known case of the leaving investment bankers of the First
Boston Bank quoted in Stewart (1993).
In the MacLeod and Malcolmson (1998) model ﬁrms choose the proﬁt-maximizing form of
incentive payment. Employees are aware that ﬁrms can not be trusted to pay their bonuses. In
industries where vacancies are very costly (like very capital intensive industries) ﬁrms must be
able to replace workers quickly. If ﬁrms are able to replace workers quickly, then the workers
must be able to retain rent in the form of high wages. Consequently, eﬀort is provided through
the fear of loosing the job, and employees are paid ﬁxed, eﬃciency wages.4
This model does not explicitly model the emergence of ﬁxed wages theoretically. It builds
on the above theoretical results and casual industry observations. In small business lending
wages are essentially ﬁxed and performance pay is not used to create strong diﬀerences across
credit oﬃcers.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The model is presented in the next
section. In section 3 the model is solved and analyzed. Section 4 presents the centralized and
decentralized organizational framework. Section 5 discusses the empirical implications and
the links to banking consolidation and technological improvements. Section 6 summarizes and
concludes.
2 The model setup
The model considers two kinds of players: the unique bank and inﬁnitely many, identical
agents.5
Both the bank and the agents have von Neumann-Morgenstern type utility function. The
bank’s discount factor is β and the agent’s is δ,w h e r eb o t hβ,δ ∈ (0.1) The period utility
function both the bank and the agent is linear in terms of their respective payoﬀs.6 In the
following discussion the bank will be referred in the feminine, and the individual agents in the
m a s c u l i n et oe a s ei d e n t i ﬁcation.
The payoﬀs are obtained from an underlying economy. The economy consists of a contin-
uum of ﬁrms whose number is normalized to one. Each ﬁrm requires unit volume of ﬁnancing.
4Note, that in those industries where workers are very speciﬁco ri ns h o r ts u p p l yﬁrms’ renegotiating power
is weak. In these sectors performance pay functions well.
5The assumption, that agents are identical is crucial exactly as in Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984). This implies,
that agents can not signal higher quality nor is any need for screening. The inﬁnite number of agents, on the
other hand, is an innocent simpliﬁcation to allocate all bargaining power to the bank.
6Linearity is used to ease calculation as risk neutrality does not play any substantive role in the model.
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high quality ﬁrms. This q variable is an independently and identically distributed random
variable. It can take two values: in the bad state of the world qB and in the good state qG,
where qB <q G. The realization of a good or bad state is assumed for simplicity to have equal
probability, so Prob(qB)=Prob(qG)=1
2.
Financing a unit volume of high quality ﬁrms yields θH proﬁt for the bank, whereas
ﬁnancing a unit volume of low quality ﬁrms yields θL,w h e r eθL < 0 <θ H. The bank’s period
payoﬀ (πnet) is given by the banking proﬁtf r o mﬁnancing (π) minus wage paid (w) that is:
πnet = π −w. Banking proﬁtf r o mﬁnancing depends on the volume of credit granted to high
(zH) and low quality (zL) ﬁrms: π = θHzH +θLzL. Banking proﬁtc a nn o tb ev e r i ﬁed by third
parties.
The bank oﬀers a contract to an agent. If the agent accepts the oﬀer, he becomes the credit
oﬃcer. The credit oﬃcer has to exert eﬀort to ﬁnance ﬁrms. Financing high quality ﬁrms
requires high eﬀort which yields µH disutility of eﬀort on the ﬁnancing volume. Financing
low quality ﬁr m sr e q u i r e sl o w e re ﬀort, with µL. Consequently, µH <µ L < 0. The credit
oﬃcer’s period payoﬀ, is given by the disutility of the eﬀort plus the wage paid by the bank;
formally u = µHzH +µLzL+w. Eﬀort levels can be observed by both the bank and the credit
oﬃcer, but can not be veriﬁed by a third party.
The disutilities of eﬀort implicitly model a two-tier eﬀort setting. First, the credit oﬃcer
h a st oe x e r tas c r e e n i n ge ﬀort to learn the quality of ﬁrms or to learn the local economy. This
is represented by µL < 0. Second, the credit oﬃcer has to make additional eﬀort to ﬁnance
high quality ﬁrms. This can be interpreted as an eﬀort to close the deal with high quality
ﬁrms. The additional eﬀort is represented by µH −µL < 0.T h et w oe ﬀorts are represented in
the joint parameter restriction µH <µ L < 0.
The agent receives ¯ u period utility, if he declines the contract or does not receive an oﬀer.
This ¯ u is the value of the credit oﬃcer’s outside option.
The disutility of eﬀort level is assumed to be monetized to allow for welfare comparisons.
The utility and proﬁtv a l u e sa r es e ts ot h a tﬁnancing high quality ﬁrms is optimal from a
Pareto perspective, that is 0 <µ H + θH.
The parameter values are also assumed to take values which imply positive ﬁnancing
volumes.7 This is an innocent technical assumption and greatly simpliﬁes the exposition by
eliminating the need to repeatedly exclude the uninteresting corner solution of zero ﬁnancing.
T h eb a n k ’ sa c t i o ns e th a st h r e ee l e m e n t s[w, π∗,R (zH,z L,π)]. The three elements of the
contract specify a wage (w),ap r o ﬁtt a r g e t(π∗) and a retaining/ﬁring rule (R). The bank
later observes ﬁnancing volumes (zH,z L) and proﬁtv a l u e(π) and decides to retain (R =1 )
7This implies that either 0 <q BθH +
qBµH




δ − ¯ u.
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or ﬁre (R =0 )the credit oﬃcer accordingly.T h ec r e d i to ﬃcer’s action set has three elements: A(w,π∗),z H(A(w,π∗),q),z L(A(w,π∗),q).
The credit oﬃcer at each time period chooses to accept (A =1 )or decline (A =0 )the contract
oﬀered. Conditional on accepting the contract (which depends on the content of it) and the
realization of q the credit oﬃcer can choose which ﬁrms to ﬁnance (zH,z L) a n di np a r t i c u l a r
whether or not to comply with the proﬁt target.
The game consists of inﬁnitely many identical periods. The timing within a period allows
the credit oﬃcer to learn the state of the world only on the job. Formally the timing is as
follows:
1. The bank oﬀers a contract (w,π∗) to an agent.
2. The agent accepts or declines the oﬀer. If he accepts the oﬀer, he will be referred to as
the credit oﬃcer. If the agent declines the contract, the period ends.
3. If the credit oﬃcer has accepted the contract, he observes the state of the world.
4. The credit oﬃcer grants credit.
5. The bank observes proﬁt level, credit volume and she decides whether the credit oﬃcer
has complied with the contract. If she believes, that the credit oﬃcer has complied, then he
is retained, otherwise he is ﬁred.
The parameter values, the form of the utility functions, and the ex-ante distribution of
the state variable are common knowledge among the players. The players also know their
own decisions. The bank observes proﬁt level, credit volume of all credit oﬃcers employed by
her. However, credit oﬃcers do not learn about previous credit oﬃcers’ decisions. The most
important information asymmetry is that the bank can never observe the actual realization
of the state of the world, while the agents can learn it after accepting the contract.
The model conﬁnes attention to a subset of all possible strategies.8 First, the strategy set
is limited to pure strategies. Pure strategies are used to ease the interpretation of the results.
Second, the model seeks a stationary solution since the problem is also stationary. All players
face essentially the same problem in each period, as the realization of q is identically and
independently distributed. Although the individual agent might change across periods, the
problem faced by the diﬀerent agents remains the same. Third, the model conﬁnes attention to
subgame perfect Nash-equilibria in order to exclude unreasonable threat or promise strategies.
Finally, the model assumes that the bank always opts for the grimmest possible punishment
strategy. The grimmest punishment means that whenever the bank ﬁnds that the credit oﬃcer
has not complied with the contract, he is ﬁred and the bank will never rehire that particular
agent.9
8In line with restricting the strategies a simple tie-breaking is assumed. The indiﬀerent player chooses a
solution such that the other player is better-oﬀ.
9Note that the grimmest punishment promotes the strongest incentives to the agent to comply with the
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The bank designs the contract so that the agent accepts it, and later in his role as the credit
oﬃcer complies with it. This condition implies the two usual types of conditions.
First, the Individual Rationality constraint (IR) has to be satisﬁed. Through this con-
dition, the agent has an incentive to accept the contract, as the lifetime expected utility of
accepting a contract (UA) is weakly higher than the lifetime expected utility of declining it
(UD).
Second, the Incentive Compatibility constraints, denoted as ICB and ICG,h a v et ob es a t i s -
ﬁed. The agent has an incentive to comply with the contract (as the bank deﬁnes compliance),
if the lifetime expected utility of compliance is weakly higher than that of non-compliance.
Utility of compliance is denoted (UCB,U CG) in the bad and good state of the world respec-
tively. Similarly, the utility of non-compliance is denoted as (UNB,U NG).
The incentive conditions are stated concisely using the above notations as follows:
UD ≤ UA (IR)
UNB ≤ UCB (ICB)
UNG ≤ UCG (ICG)
3.1 The utility Bellman equations
The lifetime expected utilities can be determined by Bellman equations in a stationary context.
The lifetime expected utility of accepting the contract (UA) is given by the expectation on
the two lifetime expected utilities of compliance (UCB,U CG). Agents who reject the contract
are never oﬀered a contract again, because the grimmest punishment strategy is used. So the
utility of rejecting the contract (UD) is given by the discounted sum of the outside option
payment stream.
The lifetime expected utilities of complying with the contract (UCB,U CG) can be deter-
mined in a similar manner. They have two main components: the period utility derived from
complying to the contract (uCB,u CG) and the continuation value of the contract. By the IR
constraint the agent accepts the contract whenever oﬀered, so the continuation value is the
discounted value of the lifetime expected utility of accepting the contract (UA). Similarly, the
value of non-compliance is given by the period utility (uNB,u NG) and the discounted value of
non-continuation. The value of non-continuation is the discounted sum of the outside option
payment stream, which is the same as the lifetime expected utility of rejecting the contract
contract. Not rehiring a particular agent, however, incurs no cost on the bank as there are inﬁnitely many,
identical agents. Consequently, grimmest punishment is optimal from the bank’s point of view.
12
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UCB = uCB + δUA UNB = uNB + δUD
UCG = uCG + δUA UNG = uNG+ δUD
The above system of equations can be solved after specifying the utility values in a single
period (uCB,u NB,u CG and uNG).
3.2 Solving the Bellman equations
The period utility values can be found through ﬁnding the proﬁt maximizing compliance rules
within each periods. This is achieved by solving the stationary incentive problem backward.
Note also that solving the model backward ensures subgame perfection. The solution is as
follows:
1) The last decision is whether the bank retains the credit oﬃcer or not. The only basis
for this decision is how much proﬁt has been delivered by the credit oﬃcer.10 Consequently,
the bank sets a proﬁt threshold level and if the realized proﬁt level reaches or exceeds it, the
credit oﬃcer is considered to have complied.11 This unique threshold level can be the carefully
set proﬁt target π∗.12 Thus, the bank retains the credit oﬃcer if he met or exceeded the proﬁt
target and ﬁres him else. Consequently, the proﬁt target (π∗) entails the retaining decision.
2) Given that ﬁnancing high quality ﬁrms requires eﬀort, the proﬁt constraint is binding
for the credit oﬃcer. This means that the credit oﬃcer does not exert more eﬀort than what
is strictly necessary to meet with the proﬁt target.
T h ec r e d i to ﬃcer also does not ﬁnance low quality ﬁrms, as doing so only reduces the
proﬁt level, and still requires eﬀort. Formally zL =0 .
The period utility levels are determined diﬀerently depending on whether the credit oﬃcer
complies with the proﬁt target or not. Formally the credit oﬃcer solves the following problem:
max
zL,zH
zLµL + zHµH + w (1)
10It is easy to see that targeting on credit volume is not eﬃcient from the banks point of view. The credit
oﬃcer can easily comply with any credit volume expectations when the proﬁt expectation is not binding by
expanding the credit lines to low quality ﬁrms. This is clearly not optimal for the bank.
11Note that, there is no reason to identify more compliance regions in terms of realized proﬁt. The agent
would always choose the compliance level which requires the lowest eﬀort level. As it will be clear from the
subsequent discussion, this is the lowest proﬁt threshold level.
12Other threshold levels, determined diﬀerently in terms of the proﬁt target, are also possible. The bank
could set, for instance, compliance to 1/2 of the target. Nevertheless, the eﬀect is the same as requiring a
properly deﬁned proﬁy target to be satisﬁed.
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zH ≤ qtrue
zLθL + zHθH ≥ π∗ Compliance constraint
qtrue ∈ {qB,q G}
The credit oﬃcer satisﬁes the compliance constraint, only if he intends to do so.
2a) If the credit oﬃcer complies, that is he reaches or exceeds the proﬁt target, then he
tries to ﬁnance as few high quality ﬁrms as it is possible. The the solution to 1 yields:
zL =0 zH =
π∗
θH
The period utility is:
u = w + µH
π∗
θH
2b) If the credit oﬃcer does not comply, he exerts as little eﬀo r ta si ti sp o s s i b l e .C o n s e -
quently, the trivial solution to 1 is that he does not provide ﬁnancing to any ﬁrms:
zL = zH =0
which yields the period utility:
u = w
3) Because the IRconstraint is satisﬁed, the credit oﬃcer accepts the employment contract
oﬀered by the bank.
4) The bank has to decide on the (w,π∗) pair on the basis of the above.
The above allows for computing the period utility values (uCB,u NB,u CG and uNG)g i v e n
the employment contract (w,π∗). Thus the Bellman equation values can be derived from the
(w,π∗) pair.
3.3 The contract oﬀered
The results derived above are used as a shortcut from the (w,π∗) oﬀer pair to the period
payoﬀs. The bank can foresee the expected proﬁt of the contract given his oﬀer pair, and
oﬀers wage and proﬁt target accordingly. This is suﬃcient to determine the (w,π∗) oﬀer.
In order to determine the optimal proﬁt target level the bank has to consider two contra-
dicting eﬀects of raising proﬁt target. On one hand, while a higher proﬁt target requires higher
eﬀort level and thus higher wages, the wage increase is slower than the revenue increase. This
points towards higher proﬁt target. On the other hand, the higher the proﬁt target is, the
less likely that the credit oﬃcer is able to meet it. If he can not comply, then he shirks and
14
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points toward a lower proﬁt target.
The positive eﬀects apply continuously in the wage increase, while the negative eﬀects
appear only at two proﬁt target threshold level. If the bank increases the proﬁt target from
zero the credit oﬃcer is able to comply in all states of the world until it reaches qBθH.A f t e r
exceeding this level, the expected proﬁt level drops as the credit oﬃc e rc a nc o m p l yo n l yi nt h e
good state. Further increasing the proﬁt target starts to increase the proﬁt level again. This
eﬀect lasts until the proﬁt target reaches qGθH. Exceeding this threshold, the credit oﬃcer
can not comply anymore, not even in the good state of the world. Consequently, revenue level
drops to zero which is clearly suboptimal.
This trade-oﬀ can also be understood as an eﬀort-incentive Laﬀer-curve. Increasing target
thresholds (or incentives) initially raises expected output (and eﬀort). Nevertheless output
peaks, and eventually incentive increases lead to collapsing eﬀort level. This is fairly similar
to the original tax rate - revenue Laﬀer curve.
Figure 1 gives a qualitative view of the two contradicting eﬀects with taking qBθH =5 ,
qGθH =8 . Of course, the fact that one peak is higher is than the other on the graph is simply
the artefact of parameter choice. Theoretically, either peak can be the higher one.













Figure 1: Expected proﬁt as a function of proﬁt target
The ﬁrst peak, requiring qBθH proﬁt, is called the Frankfurt policy. The second one,
requiring qGθH proﬁt is called the London policy.
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the two cities. They are meant to provide an intuition on ﬁring and labor market regulations.
There is a caveat, however. This model is not built around labor market regulations. It
emphasizes that banks choose between the two policies on the basis of the underlying market
conditions, captured by parameter values.
The following proposition summarizes the results:
Proposition 1 (Contract Oﬀered) In equilibrium the bank oﬀers either the Frankfurt pol-
icy (π∗ = qBθH) or the London policy (π∗ = qGθH). The choice between the two equilibria








> 2qBθH then the London policy is oﬀered.
In the following the Frankfurt and London policies are characterized in detail.
3.3.1 The Frankfurt policy
In the Frankfurt policy the bank oﬀers the pair:
π∗ = qBθH w =¯ u −
qBµH
δ
The credit oﬃcer is clearly able to comply and consequently complies in every period. He
always grants qB credit to high quality ﬁrms. The originally hired credit oﬃcer is never ﬁred.
The bank’s expected period payoﬀ is as follows:




Figure 2 illustrates the Frankfurt policy graphically. For the graphical representation consec-
utive good and bad states are picked with setting qB =4and qG =5 . The Frankfurt ﬁnancing
is contrasted to the ﬁrst-best benchmark solution. The ﬁrst-best solution is to ﬁnance all high
quality ﬁrms in all states of the world and only those ones.
The Frankfurt ﬁnancing is stable. The ﬁnancing volume is optimal in the bad state of the
world, but it is insuﬃcient in the good state. The solution can be interpreted as the bank being
unable to spot certain business opportunities or more precisely, the bank is not able to force
the credit oﬃcer to exert eﬀort to use these opportunities. The amount of ﬁnancing is thus
suboptimal in expected terms. Intuitively, the bank mitigates the losses of the information
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Good Bad Good Bad Good Bad Good Bad Good Bad
Frankfurt Benchmark
Figure 2: Frankfurt policy
3.3.2 The London policy
In the London policy the bank oﬀers:
π∗ = qGθH w =¯ u −
qGµH
δ
Now, the credit oﬃcer complies only in the good state of the world. In the good state he
produces qGθH banking proﬁt. Conversely, in the bad state he can not meet the proﬁtt a r g e t .
Knowing this he stops all ﬁnancing activities, producing zero proﬁt. He still receives wages












Figure 3 illustrates the result as before with consecutive good and bad states, setting qB =4
and qG =5using the ﬁrst-best benchmark as a contrast, exactly as in the illustration of the
Frankfurt policy solution.
The London policy provides zero ﬁnancing in the bad state of the world and optimal
ﬁnancing in the good state. The solution still provides underﬁnancing in expected terms.
However, it fundamentally diﬀers from the Frankfurt solution in its volatility. The bank aims
at high eﬀort level in the good state and in exchange accepts ﬁring and slack in the bad state
of the world. The intuition behind the London policy is that the bank values the good state
high eﬀort level so much that she accepts the loss incurred in the bad state.
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Good Bad Good Bad Good Bad Good Bad Good Bad
London Benchmark
Figure 3: London policy
The London policy might be especially interesting if there are large diﬀerences between the
two states of the world, or when the good state of the world is much more likely. Acquiring an
important market segment, or lending in a booming sector might provide such circumstances.
The London policy case is also interesting because it produces equilibrium ﬁring. The
solution introduces the ﬁring or relocation of perfectly able and hard working agents as a way
of motivating agents in a ﬁxed wage contract. This ﬁring is an eﬃcient, albeit second-best
measure which provides optimal soluti o nw i t hc e r t a i np a r a m e t e rv a l u e s .
3.4 Constrained optimal contract
The question arises whether the contract proposed is the constrained optimal contract. In-
formally, the question is whether the proposed contract is the best for the bank in the game.
Formally, the constrained optimal contract is deﬁned below.
Deﬁnition: Constrained optimal contract is deﬁned to be a stationary, ﬁxed wage
and pure strategy Nash-equilibria contract that yields the highest expected proﬁt for the bank,
given the bank’s action and information set.
The Frankfurt or London policy contracts are indeed constrained optimal. The intuition
is that the bank can not compensate the credit oﬃcer in a stationary context to exert two
diﬀerent eﬀort levels such that the agent would comply in both states. Consequently, the
contract boils down to oﬀering a single (w,π∗) pair to the agent, as the agent contemplates
18
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(w,π∗) pair was analyzed in the Contract Oﬀered proposition, consequently the same result
arises in the constrained optimal contract. The following proposition formally summarizes the
result:
Proposition 2 (Constrained Optimal Contract) The solution outlined in the Contract
Oﬀered proposition is the constrained optimal contract. Consequently, either the Frankfurt or
the London policy arises as the constrained optimal contract.
This result implies that the earlier described ineﬃciencies do not stem from poorly-designed
contracts. The bank, so long as she is conﬁned to using ﬁxed wages and stationary contracts,
can not achieve higher proﬁts. Thus the proposed contract is robust and the underlying reason
for suboptimal ﬁnancing rests in the information and action structure.
4 An extension: centralization vs. decentralization
Banking organization can be captured by slightly extending the basic model. Assume that
the bank can employ K credit oﬃcers, the number of whom is determined by the exogenous
market position. The bank can employ supervisors who monitor the credit oﬃcers and it
is assumed that the bank has to employ at least one supervisor. If the supervisor monitors
weakly less than L credit oﬃcers, then the supervisor can observe the true state of the world
for each credit oﬃcer. The cost of employing a supervisor is W. Parameter L and W can be
interpreted as the technology of supervision.
We can assume that banks choose the form of operation given the parameter values. They
choose to become either centralized or decentralized banks based on proﬁt expectations.
4.1 Centralized bank
If only a single supervisor is employed and the bank is large enough (K>L ) such that the
supervisor can not observe the true state of the world, then the bank is called centralized. In
this case either the Frankfurt or the London policy results as in the basic model. Similarly
the appropriate Frankfurt or London wage applies for each credit oﬃcer.
Proposition 3 (Centralized Bank) The centralized bank implements either the Frankfurt
or London policy for each credit oﬃcer.
The proﬁt level diﬀers from the base model in two trivial ways. First, there are many
credit oﬃcers and net payoﬀs accrue for each. In order to ease comparison, proﬁtd a t ai s
computed on a per credit oﬃcer basis. The second diﬀerence is that now the bank has to pay
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cost W/K. Thus the per credit oﬃcer proﬁtl e v e l sa r ea sf o l l o w s :
πFrankfurt = qBθH +
qBµH
δ









− ¯ u −
W
K
The centralized banks chooses the more proﬁtable policy out of the two as in the base
model.
4.2 Decentralized bank
If K/L supervisors are employed with K = nL,13 then the bank is called decentralized. The
cost of supervision in the decentralized bank is W/L per credit oﬃcer. The decentralized bank
can achieve the ﬁrst-best ﬁnancing volume as it is shown below.
The decentralized bank makes use of the fact, that both the bank and the credit oﬃcer will
observe the state of the world during the contract. If the credit oﬃcer does not provide the
ﬁrst-best eﬀort level, he is ﬁred and otherwise retained. The following proposition formalizes
the argument.
Proposition 4 (Decentralized Bank) The decentralized bank achieves ﬁrst-best ﬁnancing
volume. Formally, the local bank oﬀers the employment contract that the credit oﬃcer is
retained if π = qtrueθH and ﬁred else.
The contract gives the credit oﬃcer the proper incentives to exert eﬀort eﬃciently. It
means that he ﬁnances all good ﬁrms and only good ﬁrms, so in the bad state he ﬁnances
qB volume of high quality ﬁr m sa n di nt h eg o o ds t a t eh eﬁnances qG volume of them. If
compliance is assured and the grimmest punishment strategy is used, then the utility values
can be determined in the same manner as in the base model.
The wage is:




















− ¯ u −
W
L
13Assume in the following discussion of the decentralized bank that n is a natural number. Any other number
would not change the conclusions, but would make the analysis unnecessarily cumbersome.
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supervision cost W/L is suﬃciently low or the eﬃciency gain from the ﬁrst best ﬁnancing
volume is high.
The decentralized bank policy focuses attention on information division within the ﬁrm.
The bank as a whole has the same information both in the centralized and in the decentralized
bank case, since the credit oﬃcer perfectly observes the ﬁrms. However, the decentralized bank
is more eﬃcient in lending, because the management can tailor the incentive scheme of credit
oﬃcers to the state of the economy.
4.3 Small bank
Finally, it is worth to consider the case of small banks. If the number of all credit oﬃcers is
small enough K<L , then the bank is called small bank. Here the single supervisor is necessar-
ily close to the local market. Then the bank implements the decentralized bank’s employment
contract with her credit oﬃcers. The following proposition formalizes the argument.
Proposition 5 (Small Bank) The small bank oﬀers the same employment contract as the
decentralized bank and achieves the ﬁrst-best ﬁnancing level.
Thus a small bank achieves ﬁrst-best ﬁnancing level. The problem is, however, that ﬁrst
best ﬁnancing level does not come along with necessarily high proﬁtability. The per credit
oﬃcer proﬁt levels are similar to that of the decentralized bank, but here the cost of supervision
is higher: W/K.
πDecentralized =





− ¯ u −
W
K
The existence of the small bank is the consequence of size constraints. She would always
prefers to expand her activities and utilize the supervisor better as there is wasteful super-
vision. Thus there are economies of scales for small banks, irrespective of the fact whether
centralized or decentralized banks are more proﬁtable.
5 Discussion
5.1 Comparative Statics
The model oﬀers a wide range of interesting comparative statics. Here, the two most interesting
ones are analyzed in detail: banking consolidation and technological change. One should bear
in mind that the model uses a partial setup: consequently the parameter values are set for
each bank individually. There can be small and large, centralized and decentralized bank in
the economy - while each operating optimally under their respective parameter constraints.
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Banking consolidation can be understood in the model as a large bank buying one or more
several small banks. The consequences of this banking consolidation are ambiguous. One can
identify two subcases for the analysis. The two subcases are summarized on Figure 4.
centralized decentralized
Effects of consolidation on cost efficiency positive positive
lending volume negative none
Optimal form of corporate governance
Figure 4: Eﬀects of banking consolidation
The ﬁrst case is, when centralized banks are more eﬃcient then decentralized banks. In
this case the welfare eﬀects of banking consolidation are unclear. The following trade-oﬀ
emerges: On the one hand, centralized banks buying small banks improves welfare as wasteful
supervising declines. On the other hand, this consolidation reduces small business lending,
which decreases welfare as eﬃcient ﬁnancing is not realized.
The second case is, when decentralized banks are more eﬃcient. In this case banking con-
solidation is unambiguously welfare improving. Banking consolidation only leads to declining
wasteful supervision, while small business lending remains at the ﬁrst-best level.
5.1.2 Technological improvements
The information technological improvements (captured by increasing parameter L)o ﬀers in-
teresting insights. There are two eﬀects. First, decentralized banks become relatively more
proﬁtable than centralized banks as their supervision costs are decreased. Second, small banks
become less proﬁtable relative to decentralized banks, as they waste even more supervisory
eﬀort.
Technological change has important implications in two dimensions: small business lending
and banking proﬁts. The eﬀects of technological improvements are weakly positive in both
dimension. There are three subcases,14 summarized on Figure 5.
First, if before and after the technological improvement centralized governance is optimal,
then small business lending does not change. Moreover, in this case technological improve-
ment does not even change banking proﬁtability. Second, if before and after the improvement
decentralized governance is optimal, then small business lending does not change with tech-
nology. In this case, however, banking proﬁts increase as a heavily used technology becomes
cheaper.
14The fourth case, when before the technological improvement decentralized, after it centralized banking
structure is optimal, is clearly impossible.
22
ECB
Working Paper Series No. 407
November 2004Efficient governance before the improvement: centralized decentralized centralized
after the improvement: centralized decentralized decentralized
none none positive
none positive positive
Effect on small business lending
Effect on banking profits
Figure 5: Eﬀects of supervision technology improvements
The third case is the most interesting. If before the technological change centralized
banks are optimal, but increasing L makes decentralized banks more proﬁtable, then the
eﬀects of technological change are positive in both dimension: both small business lending
and banking proﬁtability increase. The improving technology fosters the centralized bank to
decentralize and the new decentralized bank reaches ﬁrst-best lending level. Note, that for
the decentralization the bank has to employ new supervisors, thus employment also increases.
This also gives an example of job-creating technological advances.
Last, technological changes might make banking consolidation more desirable. With im-
proving technology wasteful supervision of small banks becomes increasingly costly in terms
of opportunity costs. Moreover, this consolidation is more likely not to reduce small business
lending, as technological improvements make decentralized banks more proﬁtable.
5.2 Empirically testable implications
The model oﬀers four major, empirically testable implications. First, the most important
empirical implication allows to contrast the conclusions of this model to that of the traditional
portfolio theory. Both theories predict that on average large banks ﬁnance small ﬁrms less
than small banks. In this model this is due to the potential heterogeneity of centralized and
decentralized large banks in the economy. In the portfolio theory lending diﬀerences directly
stem from the size of the bank - that is from the better diversiﬁcation options of large banks.
These predictions correspond to the ﬁndings of the empirical literature as it was reviewed
earlier: small banks ﬁnance small ﬁrms more than large banks.
The model, however, predicts signiﬁcant heterogeneity among large banks - a feature miss-
ing from the portfolio theory of lending. According to the model the crucial diﬀerence is not
the size of the bank, but rather its organizational structure. This is a testable implication
that can distinguish this model from the portfolio theory model.
There is some additional empirical evidence supporting the theoretical ﬁndings of this
paper. Corporate governance seems to aﬀect bank lending to small businesses. De Young,
Goldberg and White (1997) disentangle corporate governance eﬀects from size. They show
that after controlling for size, corporate governance variables, such as the number of branches
23
ECB
Working Paper Series No. 407
November 2004or participation in a bank holding, aﬀect small business lending. Peek and Rosengreen (1998)
ﬁnd that when banks merge the acquiring bank tend to recast the target to its own image.
Thus, small business lending seems to be more related to banking governance than to size.
Nevertheless, further speciﬁc empirical research is needed to test this prediction more precisely.
The second testable implication is, that the model predicts small banks to be less proﬁtable
than large banks. Small banks wastefully supervise, consequently they are less proﬁtable, even
though they produce ﬁrst-best ﬁnancing volume. In line with these ﬁndings the empirical
studies such as Berger, Demsetz and Strahan (1999) show strong economies of scales for the
smallest banks - and only for them.
Third, the wage in the decentralized or in the small bank is between the Frankfurt and
London policy wage rate. As the internal structure of banking was not traditionally in the
focus of research, the wage implications are not yet analyzed. Such an analysis could provide,
nevertheless, a strong test for the model.
Finally, the model also has a few implications for the economies of scales of large banks. If
the centralized solution is the most proﬁtable, then there are economies of scales at all sizes.
Though these economies of scales decline with size they are present at every operational level.
If, however, the decentralized solution is optimal, then economies of scales are not present.
The larger bank implies also proportionally more supervisors thus the per credit oﬃcer proﬁt
level remains are the same. Thus the model links small business lending to economies of scales
through banking corporate governance.
6C o n c l u s i o n
This paper explores the eﬀects of ﬁxed wages on eﬀort exertion in case of information asym-
metries. Two equilibria, namely the Frankfurt a n dt h eL o n d o np o l i c ye m e r g e ,w h i c hr e s e m b l e
to the stylized workings of the continental European and respectively the Anglo-Saxon la-
bor markets. The model’s implications are thus fairly general. The main building blocks of
the model (ﬁxed wages and information asymmetries) are indeed relevant in a wide range of
sectors in the modern economy. Consequently, the model can be used to understand many
institutions and problems besides banking. The lifetime employment in public administration
for instance, resembles what occurs under the Frankfurt policy, while the "up-or-out" career
path in consulting looks like what happens under the London policy.
The paper nevertheless concentrates on the implications in banking. It argues that ﬁxed
wages and information asymmetries are especially important in small business lending and
uses the ﬁndings of the model to investigate the consequences of banking consolidation. The
most important theoretical ﬁnding of the paper is that banking corporate governance might
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be more important in small business lending than mere size of banks.Two main policy implications can be derived. First, banking consolidation does not nec-
essarily hurt small business lending. Larger banks do not necessarily abandon small business
lending and small businesses are not per se endangered by banking consolidation. Decentral-
ized banks can take the role of small local banks. In this case, consolidation is socially optimal
as wasteful supervision in small banks is eliminated.
Second, the model highlights the need for increased scrutiny on banking corporate gover-
nance. As small business lending is potentially threatened by centralization tendencies, su-
pervisory authorities should pay adequate attention to changes in banking governance. Even
absent consolidation, changes in banking governance at several large banks might contribute
to a credit crunch for small businesses.
The paper is one of the ﬁrst papers to explicitly investigate the corporate governance of
banks. Consequently, it represents at its best a new, fresh look on banking consolidation
and banking corporate governance. There is some empirical support for the main ﬁndings,
but many theoretical and empirical implications are unclear or untested. There is much left
to do for future research. A particularly interesting avenue is building a general equilibrium
model to fully understand the economy wide implications of banking consolidation. The paper
sincerely hopes to elicit further empirical and theoretical research to better understand the
role and implications of banking corporate governance.
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7.1 Proofs
Proof of the Contract Oﬀered proposition. T h ep r o o fc a nb ed i v i d e di n t os e v e np a r t s :
(1) By the proﬁtability assumption the bank can expect positive proﬁts in equilibrium,
that is: π∗ > 0
(2) The credit oﬃcer complies at least in one state. Else zero revenue is provided and the
proﬁtability assumption is violated. Moreover, if the credit oﬃcer complies in the bad state,
then he is also able to comply in the good state.
(3) Expected proﬁti sl i n e a ri nﬁnancing volume.
If the credit oﬃcer can comply in both states of the world then
π = zHθH




(4) Wage paid is linear or declining in ﬁnancing volume as
w =¯ u −
zHµH
δ
and ¯ u ≥ 0
Derivation follows from the IR/IC constraints.





















2w + zHµH + δ¯ u
1−δ
2 − δ








(2 + δ)w +2 zHµH
2 − δ





w = wIC =¯ u −
zHµH
δ
(5) Consequently, as ﬁnancing is proﬁtable in both states, then the bank would like to imple-
ment the maximum ﬁnancing volume
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c a nc o m p l yi nb o t hs t a t e s .( T h i ss o l u t i o ni sc a l l e dF r a n k f u r tp o l i c y . )
Similarly, if ﬁnancing is proﬁtable when the credit oﬃcer complies only in the good state
of the world, then the bank would like to implement




as it provides the highest level ﬁnancing among those contracts with which the credit oﬃcer
can comply only in the good state of the world. (This solution is called the London policy.)
(6) The bank chooses the solution which is more proﬁtable. The bank’s payoﬀ in the
Frankfurt policy is:
qBθH − ¯ u +
qBµH
δ
The bank’s expected payoﬀ i nt h eL o n d o np o l i c yi s :
qGθH
2
− ¯ u +
qGµH
δ





and if the inequality is reversed, then the London policy has higher payoﬀs.
(7) In case of proﬁt tie the solution yielding higher utility for the credit oﬃcer is chosen.
It is straightforward to see that the utility derived from the Frankfurt policy is higher than












+ qGµH + δ¯ u
1−δ
2 − δ
⇐⇒ qG >q B
This means that the credit oﬃcer’s utility in the Frankfurt case is always higher. So, in case
of proﬁt tie, the Frankfurt policy is chosen.
P r o o fo ft h eO p t i m a lC o n t r a c tp r o p o s i t i o n . T h ep r o o fc a nb ed i v i d e di n t os i xp a r t s ,
which are outlined as follows:
(1) Using the grimmest punishment is optimal from the bank’s point of view, as it was
explained at the introduction of this assumption.
(2) Given the bank’s information and action set the bank can set (w,π∗) pairs and base
her ﬁring/retaining decision about zH, zL and π.
(3) The bank can not observe the state of the world and can not provide compensation
for additional eﬀort. Consequently, the credit oﬃcer will choose the contract that requires the
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between the two, given that the wage associated with them is the same.
i) If the credit oﬃcer can not comply no credit is granted.
ii) If he can comply he gives credit only to high quality ﬁrms.
If two solutions yield the same eﬀort level, then they are identical. This follows from the
fact that ﬁnancing volume to low quality ﬁrms is always zero. Consequently, if the eﬀort level
is the same, then ﬁnancing to high quality ﬁr m si sa l s ot h es a m e .
(5) The unique eﬀort level implies unique payoﬀ levels in each state.
(6) The unique payoﬀ level implies that the contract design is reduced to ﬁnding the highest
payoﬀ (w,π∗) pairs as in the Contract Oﬀered proposition.
Proof of the Centralized Bank proposition. The proof is straightforward. The bank
can not observe the state of the world, consequently she oﬀers the same contract to each agent
as in the Contract Oﬀered proposition. Thus the results of the proposition apply and either
the Frankfurt or the London policy applies.
Proof of the Decentralized Bank proposition. Given that the bank is decentralized, the
contract oﬀered is optimal. As the wage is suﬃciently high and compliance is always possible,
the agent complies with the contract. The bank does not have any incentives to deviate and
oﬀer a diﬀerent contract either. The proof follows similar steps as the Contract Oﬀered and
Optimal Contract proposition and left to the reader.
The main intuition again is that the wage is linear in expected proﬁts, so if ﬁnancing
is proﬁtable (as it is assumed) than the maximum potential expected ﬁnancing volume is
optimal, which is the ﬁrst-best ﬁnancing level.
Proof of the Small Bank proposition. The proof follows straightforwardly from the
Decentralized Bank proposition.
7.2 Deriving utility levels and wages
Frankfurt policy
















UNG = w +
δ¯ u
1 − δ







=⇒ wIR ≥ ¯ u − qBµH
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=⇒ wICB = wICG ≥ ¯ u −
qBµH
δ
Notice that wICB = wICG >w IR as δ<1




The agent’s utility levels are as follows.
UA =










(2 + δ)w +2 qGµH + δ2¯ u
1−δ
2 − δ
UNG = w +
δ¯ u
1 − δ





2w + qGµH + δ¯ u
1−δ
2 − δ
=⇒ wIR ≥ ¯ u −
qGµH
2
In the bad state it is impossible to deliver the expected proﬁt. Consequently, the compliance
decision yields the same payoﬀs as the non-compliance and the credit oﬃcer is ﬁred. ICB is
technically always satisﬁed. The credit oﬃcer is, nevertheless, ﬁred at the end of the period.




(2 + δ)w +2 qGµH + δ2¯ u
1−δ
2 − δ
=⇒ wICG ≥ ¯ u −
qGµH
δ
Notice that wICG >w IR as δ<2, consequently:




The equilibrium is characterized by the following utility ﬁgures:
UA =





UCB = w + qBµH + δ
2w + qBµH + qGµH
2(1 − δ)
UNB = w + qGµL +
δ¯ u
1 − δ
UCG = w + qGµH + δ
2w +( qB + qG)µH
2(1 − δ)
UNG = w + qGµL +
δ¯ u
1 − δ







+ w + δ
2w +( qB + qG)µH
2(1 − δ)
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ICB : w +
δ¯ u
1 − δ
≤ qBµH + w + δ
2w +( qB + qG)µH
2(1 − δ)






ICG : w +
δ¯ u
1 − δ
≤ qGµH + w + δ
2w +( qB + qG)µH
2(1 − δ)






Notice that wICG >w ICB,a sqGµH <q BµH




























< ¯ u −
qGµH
δ
Both of these comparisons boil down to:
qB <q G
w h i c hi sa l w a y ss a t i s ﬁed by assumption.
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